Although the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Russian Federation, under leaders like Vladimir Putin, has maintained aggressive foreign policies influenced by Soviet-era ideology, resulting in repeated invasions and conflicts with neighboring countries. These actions reflect a geopolitical strategy rooted in imperial nostalgia, security paranoia, and authoritarian nationalism.
The Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 marked a supposed end to one of the 20th century’s greatest authoritarian regimes. Yet, more than three decades later, many of its core patterns like imperialism, state centralization, and repression live on in its successor state, the Russian Federation. From the Chechen wars to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia's modern foreign policy reflects deep-rooted ideological continuity with its Soviet past. Nowhere is this more evident than under President Vladimir Putin, whose rise to power brought a return to aggressive military expansionism and Cold War-style geopolitics. The legacy of the USSR remains embedded in Russia's political core, as we analyzing post-Soviet transitions, Putin’s background and ideology, his military interventions, and the ideological frameworks that sustain Russia’s persistent hostility toward the West.
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Russian Federation initially took steps toward democracy and market reform. Under Boris Yeltsin (1991–1999), Russia adopted a Western-oriented foreign policy, seeking closer ties with the United States and Europe (Stent, 2014). However, these reforms came at a steep cost. Economic collapse, widespread corruption, and the perceived humiliation of NATO’s eastward expansion provoked a nationalist backlash (Mankoff, 2011). By the late 1990s, the Russian public had grown disillusioned with liberalism and longed for strong leadership. This paved the way for the rise of Vladimir Putin and the slow abandonment of post-Soviet liberal aspirations.
Vladimir Putin’s worldview was shaped by his years in the KGB, where he served as an intelligence officer in East Germany during the Cold War. His experience convinced him that Western democratic ideals were a threat to Russian sovereignty (Gessen, 2012). After a brief stint in Saint Petersburg's city administration, he climbed rapidly through the ranks of the Federal Security Service (FSB), becoming its head in 1998. In 1999, Yeltsin appointed him as prime minister and then acting president. Putin won the 2000 election and quickly consolidated power, launching the Second Chechen War and reestablishing central control over Russia’s political system (Taylor, 2018). His leadership reintroduced many hallmarks of Soviet governance, including media censorship, secret police control, and suppression of political opposition.
Putin’s foreign policy has been marked by assertive military intervention aimed at reclaiming Russia’s regional dominance. His first major action was the brutal suppression of Chechnya in 1999–2000. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, recognizing the breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which remain under Russian control today (Cornell, 2008). The 2014 annexation of Crimea marked a turning point—Russia openly violated international law and faced sanctions from the West. Then, in 2022, Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, justifying it by falsely claiming to “de-Nazify” Ukraine and protect ethnic Russians (Galeotti, 2019). These actions are not random; they reflect a calculated attempt to rebuild a sphere of influence lost after the Soviet collapse and to position Russia as a global power capable of challenging NATO and the U.S.-led order.
Despite adopting a new name and constitution, the Russian Federation continues to promote key aspects of Soviet ideology. State-controlled media glorify Stalin and frame Western democracy as morally corrupt and dangerous (Roxburgh, 2012). Russian nationalism, heavily endorsed by the state, portrays Russia as a unique Eurasian civilization under siege from the West a view that mirrors Cold War-era Soviet rhetoric (Laruelle, 2015). Putin has also rehabilitated Soviet-era symbols and practices, such as military parades and political purges disguised as anti-corruption measures. The Orthodox Church, once suppressed by communists, now plays a central role in legitimizing the Kremlin’s rule, presenting Putin’s regime as the defender of “traditional values” (Sharlet, 2020). These ideological tools help justify aggression abroad while maintaining control at home.
A Record of Invasions by the Russian Federation (1991–2025)
Russia has engaged in or supported military intervention in several countries since the fall of the USSR:
| Year | Country/Region | Nature of Involvement |
|---|---|---|
| 1994–96, 1999–2009 | Chechnya | Internal war to crush separatism |
| 2008 | Georgia | Invasion; occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia |
| 2014 | Ukraine (Crimea) | Annexation of Crimea |
| 2015–present | Syria | Military intervention to support Bashar al-Assad |
| 2022–present | Ukraine | Full-scale invasion and war |
| 2022 | Kazakhstan | Troop deployment under CSTO to quell protests |
| Ongoing | Moldova (Transnistria) | Support for separatists and military presence |
| Ongoing | Armenia/Azerbaijan | Peacekeeping and military leverage over region |
These actions confirm that the Russian Federation continues to act on a strategic doctrine based on expansionism, regime survival, and ideological warfare.
The idea that the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 is, in many ways, an illusion. While the USSR dissolved on paper, its core political instincts autocracy, militarism, anti-Western ideology persist in the Russian Federation. Under Vladimir Putin, these tendencies have been reinvigorated and weaponized in a series of invasions, from Chechnya to Ukraine. The post-Soviet space has become a battlefield not only of military might but of historical narrative and ideological dominance. The modern Russian state is not merely an heir of the USSR, it is its resurrection in a new uniform. Understanding this continuity is essential for interpreting Russian behavior and responding to the threats it poses in 2025 and beyond.
References
Cornell, S. E. (2008). War in Georgia, Jitters all Around. Current History, 107(711), 307-314.Galeotti, M. (2019). We Need to Talk About Putin: Why the West Gets Him Wrong—and How to Get Him Right. Ebury Press.
Gessen, M. (2012). The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin. Riverhead Books.
Laruelle, M. (2015). Russian Nationalism: Imaginaries, Doctrines, and Political Battlefields. Routledge.
Mankoff, J. (2011). Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Rowman & Littlefield.
Roxburgh, A. (2012). The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia. I.B. Tauris.
Sharlet, J. (2020). The Family: The Secret Fundamentalism at the Heart of American Power. Harper Perennial. (Note: Relevant for understanding church-state synthesis in Russia through comparison.)
Stent, A. (2014). The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton University Press.
Taylor, B. D. (2018). The Code of Putinism. Oxford University Press.
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